














are	 subject	 to	more	 intense	 scrutiny.	Drawing	on	 interview	research	with	 compliance	 staff	




more	 ‘risky’	 than	 the	 general	 welfare	 population,	 a	 point	 that	 is	 often	 overlooked	 in	 the	






























capacities	 in	 the	name	of	 fighting	 social	welfare	 fraud.	 In	doing	so,	welfare	departments	have	
increasingly	taken	inspiration	from	a	host	of	traditional	and	novel	policing	tactics	(Chunn	and	
Gavigan	2006;	Ericson	2007;	Gustafson	2011;	Wacquant	2001,	2009;	Walsh	and	Marston	2008).	
Many	 state	welfare	 agencies	 now	boast	 a	 veritable	 army	 of	 fraud	 and	 compliance	 staff	 and	 a	
growing	list	of	sophisticated	technologies	for	detecting	and	investigating	fraud.	In	Australia,	the	
Department	of	Human	Services	 (DHS)	 (which	subsumed	 the	 functions	of	Centrelink1	 in	2011)	
draws	 on	 an	 expansive	 and	 sophisticated	 compliance	 regime	 comprised	 of	 advanced	 data	
analytics	 and	profiling	 technologies;	 a	 large	 and	 sophisticated	data‐matching	program;	 covert	
optical	 surveillance	 outsourced	 to	 private	 security	 companies;	 and	 a	 dedicated	 fraud	 tip‐off	
hotline	 (Prenzler	 2012).	 Increasingly,	 welfare	 bureaucrats	 in	 Australia	 and	 elsewhere	 are	
engaged	in	surveillance	and	investigation	practices,	functions	ordinarily	associated	with	police	
departments.	 Against	 this	 backdrop,	 it	 is	 perhaps	 unsurprising	 that	 the	 former	 Minister	 for	
Social	 Services,	 Scott	 Morrison,	 and	 Minister	 for	 Human	 Services,	 Marise	 Payne,	 in	 the	 then	
Prime	 Minister	 Tony	 Abbott’s	 Liberal‐National	 Coalition	 Government,	 described	 DHS	
compliance	 staff	 as	 ‘welfare	 cops’,	 likening	 their	 role	 to	 that	 of	 frontline	 street	police	 officers	
(Morrison	 and	 Payne	 2015).	Ms	 Payne’s	 successor,	 Stuart	 Robert,	 who	was	 appointed	 to	 the	
position	in	September	2015	with	the	change	of	leadership	to	Prime	Minister	Malcolm	Turnbull,	
appears	to	have	adopted	a	similar	line,	launching	‘Taskforce	Integrity’	soon	after	he	was	sworn	
into	 office	 to	 continue	 strategic	 ‘operations’	 targeting	 individuals	 at	 risk	 of	 welfare	 fraud	
(Robert	2015).		
	
Increasingly,	 these	practices	of	 ‘policing	welfare’	 are	organised	by	 logics	 of	 risk	management.	
Segments	of	the	welfare	population	identified	as	‘at	risk’	of	welfare	fraud	and/or	overpayment	
are	subject	to	more	frequent	and	intensive	surveillance.	Consequently,	these	welfare	recipients	
must	do	more	 to	demonstrate	their	eligibility	 for	welfare	entitlements	(Henman	2004).	 In	 the	
Australian	 welfare	 arena,	 women,	 and	 particularly	 single	 mothers,	 are	 often	 cast	 as	 risky.	
Women	 are	 subject	 to	 some	 of	 the	most	 intensive	 surveillance	 and	 are	 twice	 as	 likely	 to	 be	
convicted	 of	welfare	 fraud	 offences	 compared	 to	men	 (Prenzler	 2012).	 In	 the	 same	way	 that	
young	 men	 and	 boys	 are	 so	 often	 the	 object	 of	 the	 criminal	 justice	 system,	 women	 are	
overrepresented	 as	 suspects,	 as	 defendants,	 and	 in	 public	 messages	 about	 ‘welfare	 cheats’	




Whilst	 acknowledging	 the	 pervasiveness	 of	 regressive	 risk	 regimes	 in	 the	 arena	 of	 social	
security	compliance,	 this	paper	also	pays	attention	to	the	malleability	of	risk	rationalities.	Far	






by	 the	 DHS	 with	 focus	 on	 two	 risk‐based	 initiatives:	 the	 data	 mining	 customer	 profiling	
program;	 and	 the	 introduction	of	 tiered	 compliance	 reviews.	 In	doing	 so,	 I	 draw	on	12	 semi‐
structured	 interviews	 with	 DHS	 welfare	 compliance	 staff,	 supplemented	 by	 documentary	
sources.	 Analysis	 of	 these	 two	 projects	 illustrates	 how	 the	 rationality	 of	 risk	 can	 play	 out	
differently	depending	on	the	goals	and	agendas	 to	which	these	rationalities	are	aligned.	But	 it	








In	 this	paper,	 I	 first	 set	 out	 the	governmentality	 approach	 that	 I	 employ	 in	 this	 article.	 I	 then	
turn	to	an	examination	of	the	emergence	and	consolidation	of	risk	rationalities	in	the	Australian	
social	 security	 system.	 I	use	 two	case	 studies,	 the	data	mining	customer	profiling	project	and	
tiered	customer	reviews,	to	examine	key	assumptions	underpinning	risk	management	practices	
and	 how	 gender	 and	 class	 shape	 risk	 rationalities.	 Finally,	 this	 paper	 briefly	 considers	 the	







This	 paper	 utilises	 a	 governmentality	 framework	 to	 make	 sense	 of	 the	 emergence	 and	
implementation	of	 risk	 rationalities	 in	Australia’s	welfare	compliance	 regime.	Foucault	 (2007,	
2008)	 developed	 the	 concept	 of	 governmentality	 during	 two	 lecture	 series	 presented	 at	 the	
Collège	 de	 France	 in	 1977‐78	 and	 1978‐79.	 To	 explain	 this	 concept,	 he	 revived	 the	 sixteenth	
century	definition	of	‘government’	in	which	the	term	referred	broadly	to	any	calculated	plan	to	
direct	 or	 manage	 one’s	 self	 or	 others.	 From	 this	 perspective,	 welfare	 surveillance	 and	 other	
compliance	 activities	 can	 be	 construed	 as	 a	 form	 of	 governance.	 Foucault’s	 understanding	 of	




This	 concept	 has	 been	 adopted	 and	 elaborated	 by	 scholars	 into	 a	 fully‐fledged	 conceptual	
framework	 for	 examining	 specific	 projects	 of	 government	 (see	Gordon	1991;	Miller	 and	Rose	
2008;	Rose	1999;	Rose	and	Miller	1992).	Rose	and	Miller	(1992)	analyse	government	in	terms	
of	the	‘rationalities’	that	underpin	calculated	plans	to	govern	people	and	the	‘technologies’	that	





A	 governmentality	 analytic	 offers	 a	 particularly	 fruitful	 approach	 for	 the	 present	 research.	 It	
provides	 a	 critical	 lens	 through	 which	 to	 interrogate	 the	 calculated	 ways	 in	 which	 the	 DHS	
conceive	 of,	 and	 govern,	 the	 problem	 of	 welfare	 fraud	 and	 its	 proponents.	 Importantly,	 it	
facilitates	 a	 more	 nuanced	 and	 precise	 account	 of	 the	 complexities	 of	 risk‐based	 practices	
compared	 to	 totalising	 versions	 of	 state	 action.	 Through	 a	 governmentality	 lens,	 I	 can	move	
beyond	the	condemnation	of	welfare	compliance	strategies	as	wholly	punitive	and	unpack	the	
explicit	 and	 implicit	 objectives	 that	 underpin	 risk‐based	 welfare	 surveillance,	 including	 how	
gender	and	class	figure	in	these	initiatives.	
	
I	 supplement	 this	 governmentality	 analysis	 with	 empirical	 research	 of	 ‘actual’	 risk‐based	
approaches	 to	 compliance.	 In	 doing	 so,	 I	 take	 influence	 from	 Stenson’s	 (2005:	 266;	 see	 also	
Lippert	 and	 Stenson	 2010)	 ‘realist	 governmentality’	 approach	 in	which	 ‘discourse	 analysis	 of	
mentalities’	 is	 combined	with	 ‘grounded,	empirical,	 realist	 analysis	of	governing	practices’.	As	




pays	 attention	 to	 context	 and	 the	 ‘conditions	 of	 possibility	 and	 contingency’	 (Lippert	 and	
Stenson	 2010:	 486).	As	 Stenson	 contends	 (2005:	 274),	 combining	 a	 governmentality	 analysis	









Nikolas	 Rose	 (1999:	 19)	 has	 argued	 for	 a	 separation	 of	 governmentality	 ‘diagnoses’	 and	
sociologies	of	governance.	But	as	O’Malley	(2010a:	329)	asserts,	 ‘It	could	be	argued	…	that	no‐
one	can	 legislate	how	[governmentality]	must	be	performed	and	what	 it	must	or	must	not	be	
articulated	with’.	 In	 line	with	O’Malley’s	 sentiments,	 I	 view	governmentality	 as	 a	more	elastic	
‘analytical	toolbox’,	which	can	be	utilised	by	scholars	in	a	variety	of	ways	for	different	purposes.	










interview	 data	 to	 examine	 the	 enactment	 of	 risk	 rationalities	 within	 the	 DHS’s	 Business	
Integrity	Division.	 Specifically,	 I	 draw	 from	12	 semi‐structured	 interviews	 conducted	 in	2014	







These	 interviews	were	 conducted	with	 the	 permission	 of	 the	 DHS	 and	 under	 the	 terms	 of	 a	
Memorandum	of	Understanding	(MoU).	All	but	two	interviews	were	conducted	in	person	across	
four	 Australian	 jurisdictions.	 All	 interviews	 lasted	 between	 45	 minutes	 and	 1.5	 hours.	 The	
interviews	were	 coded	 thematically,	 paying	 particular	 attention	 to	 issues	 of	 risk	 and	 gender,	






The	 core	 of	 the	 documentary	 source	 data	 derives	 from	 a	 systematic	 analysis	 of	 all	 annual	








It	 is	however	 important	 to	recognise	the	 limitations	of	 the	data.	First,	 the	 interview	sample	 is	
unquestionably	 small	 and	 selective.	 This	 is	 particularly	 true	when	 considering	 the	 size	of	 the	
Business	Integrity	(BI)	division,	which	comprises	hundreds,	perhaps	thousands,	of	staff	working	





























of	 guarding	 against	 fraud	 and	 abuse.	 In	 fact,	 in	 Australia,	 police	 officials	 were	 intimately	
involved	 in	 the	 administration	 of	 the	 first	 Invalid	 and	 Old‐Age	 Pension	 schemes	 in	 the	 early	
twentieth	century.	According	 to	 the	NSW	Police	Manual	 (1915:	90),	 officers	were	 responsible	
for	assisting	claimants	with	pension	documents,	and	were	charged	with	investigating	the	‘truth	
of	 statements	 contained	 in	 claims’.	 From	 the	 outset,	 the	 administration	 of	 the	 pension	 in	
Australia	assumed	the	dishonesty	of	applicants.	 In	Henman	and	Marston’s	words	(2008:	194),	




significantly	 in	 recent	 decades.	 Whereas	 previous	 forms	 of	 welfare	 surveillance	 and	
investigation	were	 largely	discretionary	and	ad	hoc,	since	the	 late	1970s,	welfare	policing	has	
become	 increasingly	 centralised,	 systematic	 and	 risk‐based.	 Certainly,	 targeting	 more	
‘suspicious’	or	apparently	underserving	welfare	recipients	is	far	from	new	(Henman	2004).	But	
the	emergence	of	actuarial	risk	logics	in	the	welfare	arena	and	the	concomitant	rise	of	advanced	




in	 the	welfare	state.	 In	 the	mid	 to	 late	1970s,	 in	 the	context	of	economic	crisis,	welfare	states	
across	 the	West	 were	 increasingly	 under	 attack.	 By	 1974,	 Australia,	 along	 with	much	 of	 the	
Western	world,	was	in	the	midst	of	recession,	punctuated	by	growing	long‐term	unemployment,	
and	rising	 inflation	and	 interest	 rates.	This	 tumultuous	economic	climate	produced	a	 sense	of	
crisis	 and	 vulnerability,	 inviting	 scrutiny	 of	 the	 reigning	 logic	 of	Keynesianism	 (Archer	 2009;	











faith	 in	 the	 globalised	 and	 liberalised	 market	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	 socially	 conservative	
valorisation	 of	 traditional	 institutions,	 such	 as	 the	 family	 and	 retributive	 punishment,	 on	 the	
other	 (Mendes	 2008;	 O’Malley	 1999).	 Whilst	 there	 are	 tensions	 within	 this	 alliance,	 both	
neoliberals	and	neoconservatives	reject	Universalist	approaches	to	welfare	provision	and	share	
a	 belief	 in	 individual	 responsibility	 for	 unemployment.	 Unsurprisingly	 then,	 ‘pruning’	 the	




Perhaps	 ironically,	 attempts	 to	 reduce	 the	 costs	 of	 welfare	 coincided	 with	 a	 massive	
redeployment	 of	 state	 resources	 to	 scrutinise	 and	 monitor	 welfare	 recipients	 (Pemberton	
1980).	 In	 1977,	 specialist	 Benefit	 Control	 sections	 were	 established	 to	 investigate	 non‐
compliance	and	fraud.	These	quickly	swelled	from	just	15	staff	to	106	staff	in	1979,	whilst	the	
number	of	Field	Officers	jumped	from	188	to	350	in	the	same	period	(Pemberton	1980:	33‐34).	
So‐called	 ‘saturation	checks’	were	also	 introduced,	 in	which	 field	officers	 knocked	on	 literally	
hundreds	 of	 thousands	 of	 claimants’	 doors	 to	 check	 their	 eligibility	 (see	 Benefits	 Checks	
Confirmed	1978).		
	
The	 rapid	 increase	 in	 the	 numbers	 of	 welfare	 claimants	 led	 the	 Department	 to	 re‐think	 its	
approach	 (DSS	 1997).	 The	 localised	 and	 personalised	 policing	 of	 decades	 past	was	 no	 longer	
feasible.	As	the	1978‐79	Department	of	Social	Security	(DSS)	Annual	Report	(1979:	58)	reads:		
	
Ensuring	 that	 each	 individual	 obtains	 his	 or	 her	 correct	 entitlement	 under	 the	
relevant	legislation	has	inevitably	been	made	more	difficult	by	the	rapid	growth	
in	 the	 numbers	 covered	 by	 income	 support	 programs	 administered	 by	 the	
Department	…	While	the	rate	of	 identification	of	 [false]	claims	can	be	 increased	
by	more	detailed	examination,	a	disproportionate	level	of	resources	would	need	
to	be	employed	…	The	Department	believes	that	the	problems	associated	with	the	
scale	 of	 its	 payments,	 the	 extent	 of	 decentralisation	 of	 its	 functions,	 and	 the	
existence	of	fraud,	can	best	be	tackled	using	innovative	methods.	
	
Whilst	 the	 language	 of	 risk	 is	 not	 yet	 explicit,	 this	 statement	 hints	 at	 its	 development.	 This	
passage	 also	 suggests	 the	 Department’s	 acceptance	 of	 the	 need	 to	 target	 surveillance	 on	
particular	segments	of	the	welfare	population.	Already,	the	Department	had	introduced	periodic	
reviews	of	pensioners	‘whose	entitlements	are	liable	to	vary’,	again	suggesting	a	move	towards	
selective	 application	of	 surveillance	practices	 based	on	 apparent	 likelihood	of	 debt	 and	 fraud	
(DSS	1979:	58).		
	




doubt	 that	 risk	 logics	 have	 enjoyed	 exponential	 growth	 in	 recent	 decades.	 For	Zedner	 (2007:	
262),	the	rise	of	risk‐based	approaches	is	linked	to	the	emergence	of	a	‘pre‐crime’	society.	The	
label	 ‘pre‐crime’	 captures	 the	 temporal	 shift	 in	 dominant	 understandings	 and	 responses	 to	
crime:	 no	 longer	 is	 crime	 ‘conceived	 principally	 as	 harm	 or	 wrongdoing	 and	 the	 dominant	
ordering	 practices	…	 post	 hoc’;	 now,	 ‘crime	 is	 conceived	 essentially	 as	 risk	 or	 potential	 loss’	
requiring	pre‐emptive	responses	to	forestall	future	crime	(Zedner	2007:	262).	In	short,	the	rise	








neoliberal	 ideologies.	 In	 O’Malley’s	 words,	 risk	 and	 neoliberalism	 have	 certain	 ‘elective	
affinities’	(O’Malley	2001:	89).	Risk	management	techniques	appeal	to	the	neoliberal	emphasis	
on	 efficiency,	 cost	 effectiveness	 and	 accountability.	 Similarly,	 neoliberal	 faith	 in	 individualism	
and	‘personal	responsibility’	fits	neatly	with	predictive	risk	technologies,	which	focus	attention	
on	 individual	risk	 factors	rather	 than	social	causes	 (O’Malley	2001).	Furthermore,	 as	Henman	
and	 Marston	 (2008:	 200)	 argue,	 neoliberal	 welfare	 rationalities	 effectively	 require	 risk	
technologies:	
	
Given	 the	 increasingly	 individualised	 explanations	 of	 disadvantage	 and	 social	
inequality	in	line	with	a	pervasive	neoliberal	rationality,	the	governance	of	social	









emphasis	on	developing	 its	 risk‐based	approaches.	 In	1986,	 the	DSS	 (1986:	81)	reported	 that	
‘Good	 progress	 has	 been	 made	 on	 the	 development	 of	 a	 risk‐related	 approach	 to	 the	
investigation	of	 new	claims’.	 In	 the	 following	year,	 the	DSS	 (1987:	24)	elaborated	on	 its	 risk‐
based	approach,	noting:		
	
The	 Department	 believes	 that	 frequent,	 detailed	 reviews	 of	 all	 clients	 to	 be	
inappropriate	because	most	are	honest	and	meet	their	obligations	under	the	law.	
Reviewing	 all	 clients	 also	 wastes	 resources.	 The	 Department,	 therefore,	 has	
developed	 a	 risk‐based	 approach	 to	 select	 those	 cases	 most	 likely	 to	 need	
attention.	Statistical	surveys	are	analysed	to	provide	an	outline	of	people	with	an	
above	average	risk	of	incorrect	payment.	The	computer	selects	clients	with	these	
characteristics	 and,	 through	 the	 National	 Selective	 Review	 System	 (NSRS),	
regional	office	staff	are	asked	to	review	them.		
	
In	 other	words,	 the	 Department	 analysed	 recipient	 data	 using	 statistical	methods	 to	 develop	












across	 the	 private	 and	 public	 sectors,	 risk‐based	 welfare	 surveillance	 has	 only	 continued	 to	
grow.	Risk	technologies	have	become	more	sophisticated	and	large‐scale.	Since	2004,	the	DHS	–	
and	Centrelink	before	 it	 –	 has	 progressively	 increased	 its	 data	mining	 capacity,	 including	 the	
establishment	 of	 a	 dedicated	 data	 mining	 team	 in	 2009	 to	 employ	 ‘advanced	 statistical	
techniques’	 to	 identify	 high	 risk	 customers	 (Australian	 Government	 2009).	 Yet,	 while	 the	









It	 is	 important	 to	 recognise	 that	 the	 emergence	 of	 risk‐based	 welfare	 surveillance	 occurred	
alongside	 the	 development	 of	 a	 host	 of	 other	 tools	 and	 technologies	 for	 monitoring	 welfare	
recipients	 that	do	not	 rest	on	risk	 logics	or	at	 least	not	 the	same	kinds	of	actuarial	 risk	 logics	
outlined	 above.	 For	 example,	 Centrelink’s	 fraud	media	 strategy,	which	 centres	 on	 publicising	
successful	 fraud	 prosecutions,	 is	 explicitly	 understood	 as	 a	 ‘deterrent	 measure	 for	 those	
customers	who	may	consider	that	failing	to	meet	their	obligations	carries	no	detrimental	effects’	
(Centrelink	 2009).	 It	 also	 represents	 a	 public	 display	 of	 the	 state’s	 vigilance	 in	 the	 face	 of	
welfare	fraud,	a	strategy	that	Garland	might	refer	to	as	an	‘expressive’	strategy	(Garland	2001).	
Similarly,	 the	Centrelink	 fraud	tip‐off	 is	not	a	risk	tool,	but	 instead	reflects	a	 ‘responsibilizing’	
strategy	 in	which	the	state	requests	 the	support	of	citizens	 in	the	 fight	against	 fraud	(Garland	
2001).	 In	 short,	 the	 rationality	 of	 risk	 is	 a	 core	 organising	principle	 in	 the	Australian	welfare	
compliance	regime,	but	it	is	not	the	only	rationality	in	operation.		
	
Indeed,	during	the	 late	1990s,	 the	emphasis	shifted	 from	targeted	risk‐based	surveillance	to	a	




review	 benchmarks	were	 even	 higher.	 For	 example,	 in	 2005‐06	 Centrelink	 conducted	 over	 4	
million	reviews,	representing	about	two	thirds	of	the	customer	population	(Centrelink	2006:	9,	
27).	 In	 2009‐10	 there	 were	 3.5	million	 reviews	 conducted	 against	 a	 population	 of	 about	 7.2	









incorrect	 payments’	 (Australian	 Government	 2009).	 This	 would	 include	 ‘using	 advanced	
statistical	 techniques	 to	 identify	 high‐risk	 customers	 who	 would	 otherwise	 not	 have	 been	
identified	 under	 current	 approaches’	 (Australian	 Government	 2009).	 This	 followed	 more	
tentative	moves	 by	 Centrelink	 to	 develop	 its	 data	mining	 capability,	 including	 undertaking	 a	
data	mining	pilot	in	the	2007	financial	year	(Australian	Government	2006).	In	2004,	Centrelink	




Centrelink	 in	 2011,	 the	 Data	 Mining	 Team	 formed	 part	 of	 the	 DHS,	 initially	 housed	 in	 the	




As	Daniel	 (SNC)	explains,	one	of	 the	main	roles	of	 the	Data	Mining	Team	has	been	to	 identity	
‘non‐compliance	 or	 customers	 who	 are	 at	 risk	 of	 becoming	 non‐compliant,	 or	 who	 have	
committed	fraud’.	Using	a	range	of	data	mining	techniques,	the	Team	mines	the	DHS	mainframe	
using	algorithms	 to	 identify	patterns	associated	with	welfare	debt	or	 fraud	 (Daniel	 SNC).	The	





such	as	 sex,	 age,	home	ownership	 status,	 Indigenous	status,	number	of	 children	and	payment	
type,	 as	 well	 as	 activity	 data:	 for	 example,	 registering	 a	 change	 of	 address	 or	 change	 in	
circumstances	with	the	Department	(Bohlscheid	2013).		
	
One	 initiative	 of	 the	 Data	 Mining	 Team,	 undertaken	 whilst	 it	 was	 part	 of	 the	 CCB,	 was	 the	
customer	 risk	 profiling	 project.	 To	 put	 it	 crudely,	 the	 Data	 Mining	 Team	mined	 ten	 years	 of	
customer	 data	 in	 the	 Centrelink	 Mainframe	 using	 decision	 tree	 methodology	 to	 identify	
demographic	 characteristics	 associated	 with	 welfare	 claimants	 that	 had	 been	 overpaid	
(interview	with	Henry,	SNC;	see	also	Bohlscheid	2013;	Zhao	et	al.	2009).	Based	on	the	results	
from	mining	this	data,	the	Team	developed	risk	profiles	and	applied	them	to	the	current	social	
security	 population	 to	 rank	 recipients	 as	 low,	 moderate,	 high	 or	 very	 high	 risk	 (Bohlscheid	
2013;	 Cao	 2012).	 As	 Henry	 (SNC)	 explains,	 ‘let’s	 say	 there’s	 600,000	 Newstart	 customers,2	








the	 Data	Mining	 Team:	 ‘[I]nstead	 of	 doing	 4	million	 reviews	 a	 year,	 we	 could	 reduce	 it	 to	 1	
million.	 You	 can	 imagine	 the	 savings	 attached	 to	 that’.	 Data	mining	 is	 thus	 lauded	 as	 a	more	
effective	and	efficient	means	for	prioritising	compliance	activities.	
	
The	Data	Mining	Team	is	now	housed	within	 the	SNC	Section.	Consequently,	 its	work	 is	more	
focused	 on	 identifying	 patterns	 and	 developing	models	 to	 detect	 fraud.	 Differing	 views	were	
presented	 by	 participants	 about	 the	 process	 of	 making	 selections	 from	 the	 data	 in	 the	 SNC,	
which	may	be	the	result	of	recent	and	significant	changes	to	the	team,	including	its	shift	to	the	
SNC	Section.	According	to	Henry,	speaking	in	2014,	‘what	we	do	now	is,	we	continue	to	meet	the	
needs	 of	 compliance	 by	 sending	 them	 selection	 cases,	 but	we	 cream	off	 the	 top	 and	we	 send	
them	 to	 the	 Intelligence	 Assessment	 Unit	 for	 investigation	 and	 that’s	 working	 out	 extremely	











not	 the	same	as	 that	of	 someone	who	 is	behaving	 in	a	 fraudulent	manner.	 So	 if	
you	 build	 the	 model	 to	 target	 non‐compliance,	 the	 top	 one	 per	 cent	 is	 not	























behaviour	 and	 status	 markers	 that	 serve	 as	 reliable	 indicators	 of	 a	 probable	 future’	 (Gandy	
2006:	 364).	 This	 calculative	 process	 is	 underpinned	 by	 a	 rationality	 of	 risk;	 individuals	 are	












the	 biases	 that	 may	 be	 embedded	 in	 the	 data.	 Unemployed	 recipients	 and	 single	 parent	
pensioners	have	long	been	more	frequent	targets	of	compliance	initiatives,	and	this	is	likely	to	
be	 reflected	 in	 the	 compliance	 data.	 The	 historical	 focus	 on	 these	 segments	 of	 the	 benefit	
population	 has	 not	 necessarily	 been	 underpinned	by	 evidence	 that	 these	 recipients	 are	more	
prone	 to	 fraud	 and/or	 non‐compliance.	 Instead,	 it	 reflects	 entrenched	moral	 anxieties	 about	
these	 payment	 recipients	 who	 have	 apparently	 failed	 to	 get	 a	 job	 (or	 keep	 a	 man).	 These	
segments	 of	 the	 welfare	 population	 have	 routinely	 been	 cast	 as	 less	 deserving	 than	 other	
welfare	beneficiaries,	 such	 as	disability	pensioners	 that	 apparently	need	assistance	due	 to	no	
fault	 of	 their	 own	 (although	 this	 latter	 assumption	 itself	 may	 also	 be	 unravelling)	 (Mendes	
2008).	
	
It	 is	 perhaps	 no	 surprise	 then	 that,	 when	 the	 former	 Department	 of	 Social	 Security	 (DSS)	
introduced	 the	 National	 Selective	 Review	 System	 in	 the	 1986	 financial	 year,	 it	 initially	 only	
applied	 to	 sole	 parent	 pensioners	 and	 unemployment	 benefit	 recipients,	 although	 as	 the	DSS	
explained,	 ‘[i]n	 the	next	couple	of	years	 the	system	will	be	expanded	to	cover	all	pension	and	
benefit	types,	as	well	as	recipients	of	the	various	forms	of	assistance	to	families’.	Single	parent	
pensioners	 and	 unemployment	 benefit	 recipients	 were	 also	 subject	 to	 mandatory	 in‐office	
interviews	and	were	the	sole	focus	of	Mobile	Review	Teams	(DSS	1987:	25‐6).	In	the	late	1980s,	





activities	 have	 focused	 on	 all	 payment	 recipients.	 But	 single	 parents	 and	 the	 unemployed	
continued	to	attract	more	frequent	attention.	For	example,	in	2004‐05	a	special	budget	measure	
provided	 for	 Centrelink	 to	 ‘undertake	 20,000	 face‐to‐face	 interviews	 each	 year	 for	 Parenting	
Payment	 (Single)	 customers	 who	 report	 a	 change	 of	 address’,	 with	 the	 purpose	 of	 verifying	
recipients’	 relationship	 status	 (Australian	 Government	 2004).	 The	 historical	 focus	 on	 single	












be	 discerned	 from	 articles	 published	 by	 consultants	 previously	 working	 for	 Centrelink.	 For	
example,	 using	 positive	 and	 negative	 sequence	 methodologies,	 Zhao	 et	 al.	 (2009)	 identified	
customers	aged	21	to	28	years	who	rent,	and	have	a	partner	who	earns	casual	income,	as	having	
a	high	probability	of	incurring	a	welfare	overpayment.	On	the	other	hand,	customers	who	own	















be	 classed	 as	more	 risky	 than	men	without	 children.	 Single	women	have	been	 found	 to	be	 at	
greater	risk	of	not	repaying	debts	(Bohlscheid	2013).	Yet,	we	know	that	single	parent	families,	







After	 submitting	 a	 draft	 version	 of	 this	paper	 for	 review,	 senior	management	 ran	 some	basic	









to	 base	 decisions	 about	 who	 should	 be	 subject	 to	 surveillance	 on	 these	 factors?	 It	 may	 be	
undesirable	in	a	liberal	democratic	society	to	rely	on	demographic	variables	at	all,	particularly	if	
they	 would,	 in	 other	 contexts,	 be	 considered	 inappropriate	 or	 discriminatory.	 Yet,	 simply	
omitting	the	most	sensitive	or	problematic	variables,	such	as	sex,	race	or	marital	status,	would	
not	necessarily	answer	this	problem.	Firstly,	many	other	variables	correlate	with	these	sensitive	







In	 any	 case,	 the	 fact	 remains	 that	 women	 are	 overrepresented	 in	 the	 prosecution	 statistics	
(Prenzler	 2012).	 In	 2013‐14,	 the	 most	 recent	 statistics	 available,	 women	 made	 up	
approximately	 62.8	 per	 cent	 of	 convictions	 (Senate	 Standing	 Committee	 on	 Legal	 and	
Constitutional	Affairs	2015).	In	the	same	year,	women	comprised	approximately	57.9	per	cent	
of	 the	 social	 security	population	 (DSS	2014).	Whilst	women	are	 slightly	overrepresented	as	a	








results	 and	 the	 data	 that	 comes	 back	 and	 forth	 and	 because	 I	 work	 in	 the	
Centrelink	mainframe,	I	guess	my	excuse	is	that	I’ve	always	looked	at	cases	based	
on	the	populations	they	come	from	and	I’m	so	analytical	it’s	not	really	people.	So,	







Ultimately,	 the	 process	 of	 risk	 profiling	 reduces	 the	 complex	 individual	 and	 social	 causes	 of	
welfare	debt	 into	 individualised	 risk	 factors	produced	by	algorithms.	As	Henman	 (2004:	179)	
contends,	 in	 this	 process	 ‘the	 social	 and	 systemic	 aspects	 of	 the	 differential	 distribution	 of	
overpayments	are	deflected’.	Data	mining	does	not	and	cannot	enquire	into	the	cause/s	of	this	
overpayment.	 It	 instead	 focuses	 on	 post	 hoc	 risk	 management,	 usually	 in	 the	 form	 of	 debt	
recovery	 and/or	 investigation.	 This	 framework	 largely	 forecloses	 prevention	 or	 systemic	
reform	as	a	legitimate	response	to	non‐compliance.	A	number	of	studies	indicate,	 for	example,	
that	 simplifying	 complex	 income	 reporting	 obligations,	 particularly	 in	 light	 of	 the	 rise	 of	




As	a	result	of	data	mining	activities	 in	 the	DHS,	 far	 less	people	have	been	subject	 to	 intrusive	
entitlement	 reviews.	 But	 these	 activities	 also	 result	 in	 closer	 scrutiny	 of	 specific	 welfare	







Compliance	 Branch	 (CCB),	 which	 is	 concerned	 with	 overpayment	 and	 payment	 integrity	 as	
opposed	to	fraud,	the	introduction	of	a	tiered	system	of	compliance	reviews	has	ultimately	led	
to	 less	 accusatory	 and	 punitive	 interactions	 between	 the	 DHS	 and	welfare	 recipients.	 In	 this	
setting,	 risk	practices	are	 informed	by	 the	goals	of	economic	efficiency	and	early	 intervention	










based	 business	 model	 and	 implementing	 a	 number	 of	 early	 intervention	




with	 ensuring	 payment	 accuracy	 and	 raising	 overpayments,	 the	 previous	 review	 process	
effectively	 assumed	 the	 dishonesty	 of	 payment	 recipients.	 These	 ‘whole	 of	 payment	 reviews’	
involved	a	 full	 scale	examination	of	 the	person’s	 circumstances,	which	often	 included	 seeking	
information	from	customers’	employers	and	financial	institutions	and	inquiring	into	customers’	
relationship	status	and	 living	arrangements.	All	 information	provided	by	customers	had	to	be	





























a	 nudge	 approach	 can	 be	 a	 corrective	 to	 fallible	 human	 behaviour	 (Leggett	 2014).	Nudge	 is	
distinguished	 from	 ‘pushing’:	 that	 is,	direct	 regulatory	practices	 in	which	behaviour	change	 is	
achieved	through	regulation	or	prohibition.	The	architects	of	‘nudge’	consider	it	to	be	a	form	of	
liberal	 paternalism,	 involving	 ‘soft’	 paternalism	 whilst	 still	 acknowledging	 individual	 agency	
(Leggett	 2014:	 7).	 This	 approach	 also	 accords	 with	 the	 neoliberal	 goal	 of	 cost	 efficiency:	
‘nudging’	 behaviour	 is	 considered	 more	 efficient	 and	 effective	 than	 more	 costly	 direct	
intervention	and	this	was	one	of	the	core	reasons	for	the	introduction	of	this	model.	As	John	put	
it,	 ‘the	approach	we	had	in	place,	whilst	effective	[was]	very	costly,	very	expensive’.	The	tiered	
approach	 aims	 to	 ‘provide	 the	 same,	 if	 not	 better,	 assurance	 through	 a	 more	 efficient	
compliance	model’.		
	











…	 early	 intervention	 is	 about	 having	 a	 high	 speed	 contact	with	 a	 customer	but	
recognising	some	of	 these	customers	may	need	a	 little	bit	more	 involvement	or	
engagement	by	the	Department	to	get	their	circumstances	true	and	correct	…	So	










former	 review	process.	However,	where	previously	 these	 reviews	were	 full	 scale,	 a	 third	 tier	




As	 a	 result	 of	 this	 approach,	 the	 kinds	 of	 interactions	 the	 Department	 has	 with	 welfare	
recipients	are	 far	 less	accusatory,	 intrusive	and	ultimately	 ‘softer’.	 It	also	removes	the	general	
assumption	 that	 recipients	 are	 dishonest.	 At	 least	 in	 the	 first	 two	 tiers	 of	 the	model,	 it	 takes	
recipients’	 accounts	 of	 their	 circumstances	 at	 face	 value	 without	 seeking	 independent	
verification.	Furthermore,	it	could	be	argued	that	this	model	effectively	rearticulates	customer	
risks	as	needs.	Specifically,	risk	of	non‐compliance	is	cast	as	an	indicator	of	need	of	assistance	
and	guidance	 to	 comply.	 In	 this	way,	 risk	of	 non‐compliance	 is	 remedied	with	 assistance	 and	
education	 via	 a	 variety	 of	 interventions	 to	 enable	welfare	 recipients	 to	 navigate	 the	 complex	
social	 security	 system,	 and	 also	 avoid	 debt	 in	 the	 future.	 Whilst	 this	 risk‐based	 approach	 is	
explicitly	underpinned	by	 the	 goal	of	 cost	 efficiency	 and	 ‘nudging’	 behavioural	 change,	 it	 also	





to	 the	 post	 hoc	 management	 of	 overpayment	 and	 fraud,	 and	 is	 largely	 unconcerned	 with	
responding	 to	 the	 root	 causes	 of	welfare	 non‐compliance.	 The	politics	 of	 ‘nudge’	 assume	 that	
welfare	 recipients’	 behaviour	 simply	 needs	 to	 be	 guided	 in	 the	 right	 direction.	 It	 presents	
recipients	as	 lacking	adequate	skills,	knowledge	and	agency	to	manage	their	 lives,	rather	than	
inquiring	whether	the	compliance	system	itself	 is	 legitimate	and	fair.	The	focus	is	still	entirely	
on	 individual	 failings,	 foreclosing	 systemic	 change	 as	 a	 way	 of	 dealing	 with	 non‐compliance.	
Ultimately,	 this	 technology	 must	 be	 still	 cast	 as	 a	 tool	 of	 surveillance	 and	 population	
management.	 Like	 all	 risk‐based	 welfare	 surveillance	 initiatives,	 it	 reproduces	 the	 idea	 that	
welfare	 populations	 are	 risky	 and	 require	 intervention,	 even	 if	 the	 interventions	 that	 are	




Nevertheless,	 the	 different	 application	 of	 risk	 in	 the	 tiered	 review	 model	 illustrates	 the	





Moffat	 (2006)	 and	O’Malley	 (2001,	 2008,	 2010b)	 that	 highlight	 the	 importance	 of	 examining	
risk	technologies	in	context	in	order	to	grasp	the	multiplicity,	complexity	and	flexibility	of	risk	
logics.	As	the	examples	explored	in	this	paper	suggest,	there	is	potential	for	risk	rationalities	to	
be	 rethought	 and	 reformulated.	 Where	 compliance	 reviews	 have	 long	 acted	 as	 a	 system	 of	
informal	punishment,	through	the	technology	of	risk,	they	have	been	recast	as	opportunities	to	
guide	 and	 assist	 recipients.	 This	 suggests	 that	 concerns	 about	 justice	 and	 fairness	 may	 be	
articulated	alongside	risk.	It	opens	up	the	possibility	of	articulating	more	progressive	agendas,	
perhaps	even	 claims	 for	 redistribution,	 into	 the	accepted	 language	of	 risk.	 If,	 as	 the	 literature	
demonstrates,	financial	hardship	underlies	the	majority	social	security	fraud	offending	(see	Hui,	
Moerman	and	Rudkin	2011;	Walsh	and	Marston	2008),	increasing	welfare	payment	rates	could	
be	articulated	as	a	 fraud	risk	reduction	strategy.	 It	 is	perhaps	a	 far‐fetched	proposition	 in	the	




Over	 the	 last	30	years,	 the	Australian	DHS	and	 its	predecessors	have	established	an	 intrusive	
and	punitive	apparatus	for	detecting	and	investigating	fraud	and	overpayment.	The	rationalities	
of	risk	have	played	a	crucial	role	in	structuring	welfare	compliance	activities.	As	this	paper	has	
argued,	 entrenched	 social	 anxieties	 about	 single	 mothers	 and	 the	 unemployed	 have	 been	
translated	 into	 a	 pseudo‐scientific	 language	 of	 risk.	 In	many	ways,	 the	 rationality	 of	 risk	 has	
propelled	 the	 targeting	 of	 more	 marginalised	 welfare	 recipients	 rather	 than	 spreading	 the	
burden	of	welfare	surveillance.	By	employing	a	 ‘realist	governmentality’	approach,	 this	article	
has	 highlighted	 the	 complexity	 and	 flexibility	 of	 risk	 technologies	 in	 the	 Australian	 social	
security	system	with	reference	to	two	specific	risk‐based	initiatives:	the	data	mining	program;	
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1	Centrelink	was	established	in	1997	as	a	statutory	agency	responsible	for	the	delivery	of	human	services	under	the	
provisions	of	the	Commonwealth	Service	Delivery	Agency	Act	1997	(Cth).	On	1	July	2011,	Centrelink,	together	with	
Medicare	Australia,	was	integrated	into	the	DHS	as	a	result	of	the	Human	Services	Legislation	Amendment	Act,	2011	
(Cth).	The	Department	retained	the	brand	name	‘Centrelink’	to	refer	to	the	welfare	delivery	functions	it	took	over	
from	Centrelink	(Department	of	Human	Services	2015).	
2	‘Newstart	Allowance’	is	an	income	support	payment	for	unemployed	job	seekers.	
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